Let us try to simulate a model for determining the level of profits as a result of the efforts of the company supplying management expertise. It is natural that a portion of the profit that arose ex post facto should revert to the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment. Now, let us try to consider the level of effort selected by the company supplying management expertise. This is surely effort up till the point that the costs and revenue associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, part of the revenue, as already mentioned, is extracted by the local government in line with the proportion of their investment.  Therefore, the conditional expression determining the level of effort is

Marginal cost of increase in effort = marginal benefit of increase in effort [1 – proportion to be borne by local government (= the proportion of their investment)]

In so far as the normal assumption (increase in the marginal cost of an increase in effort implies decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, it is forecast that the bigger the proportion of private-sector investment, the more positive the impact on management.

Let us tryHere, we attempt to simulate a model for determiningthat determines the level of profits as a result ofprofit resulting from the effortseffort of the private company supplying managementbrought on board to supply business expertise. It is natural that a portionNaturally, part of the profit that arose ex post factogenerated in relevant projects should revert to the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment. Now, letLet us try to consider the level of effort selected bythat the private company supplying managementbusiness expertise. will opt for in such a situation. This iswould surely be effort up tillto the point thatwhere the costs and revenuethe earnings associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, partsome of the revenueearnings, as already mentioned, isare extracted by the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment.  Therefore, the conditional expression determining the company’s effort level of effort is

Marginal cost of increase in effort = marginal benefit of increase in effort [1 – proportion to be borne by local government (= the proportion of their investment)]

In so farThus, in as much as the normal assumption (increasea rise in the marginal cost of an increase inincreased effort implies a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, itthe expectation is forecast that the biggergreater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a positive the impact on managementthe business.

Here, we attempt to simulate a model that determines the level of profit resulting from the effort of athe private company brought on board to supply share business expertise. Naturally, part of the profit generated in relevant projects should revert accrue to the local government, in line with the proportion of their its investment. Let us consider the level of effort that the private company supplying sharing business expertise will opt forchoose to invest in such a situation. This would surely certainly be an effort level supplied up to the point where the costs and the earnings associated with increasing the effort levelefforts, when compared, are marginally equal. However, some of a part of the earnings, as already mentioned, are is extracted by the local government, in line with the proportion of their its investment.  Therefore, the conditional expression determining the company’s effort level is

Marginal cost of increasinge in effort = marginal benefit of from increasinge in  effort [1 – proportion borne by local government (= the proportion of their the government’s investment)]

Thus, in as much as the normal standard assumption of (a rise in the marginal cost of increased effort implies implying a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller lower the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, the expectation is that the greater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a greater the positive impact on the business.

Here, we attempt to simulate a model that determines the level of profit resulting from the effort of athe private company brought on board to supply share business expertise. Naturally, part of the profit generated in relevant projects should revert accrue to the local government, in line with the proportion of their its investment. Let us consider the level of effort that the private company supplying sharing business expertise will opt forchoose to invest in such a situation. This would surely be an effort level invested up to the point where the costs and the earnings associated with increasing the effort levelefforts, when compared, are marginally equal. However, some of a part of the earnings, as already mentioned, are is extracted by the local government, in line with the proportion of their its investment.  ThereforeAccordingly, the conditional expression determining the company’s effort level is

Marginal cost of increasinge in effort = marginal benefit of from increasinge in  effort [1 – proportion borne by local government (= the proportion of their the government’s investment)]

Thus, in as much as the normal standard assumption of (a rise in the marginal cost of increased effort implies implying a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller lower the effort levelinvested. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, the expectation is that the greater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a greater the positive impact on the business.

Let us try to simulate a model for determining the level of profits as a result of the efforts of the company supplying management expertise. It is natural that a portion of the profit that arose ex post facto should revert to the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment. Now, let us try to consider the level of effort selected by the company supplying management expertise. This is surely effort up till the point that the costs and revenue associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, part of the revenue, as already mentioned, is extracted by the local government in line with the proportion of their investment.  Therefore, the conditional expression determining the level of effort is

Marginal cost of increase in effort = marginal benefit of increase in effort [1 – proportion to be borne by local government (= the proportion of their investment)]

In so far as the normal assumption (increase in the marginal cost of an increase in effort implies decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, it is forecast that the bigger the proportion of private-sector investment, the more positive the impact on management.

Let us tryHere, we attempt to simulate a model for determiningthat determines the level of profits as a result ofprofit resulting from the effortseffort of the private company supplying managementbrought on board to supply business expertise. It is natural that a portionNaturally, part of the profit that arose ex post factogenerated in relevant projects should revert to the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment. Now, letLet us try to consider the level of effort selected bythat the private company supplying managementbusiness expertise. will opt for in such a situation. This iswould surely be effort up tillto the point thatwhere the costs and revenuethe earnings associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, partsome of the revenueearnings, as already mentioned, isare extracted by the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment.  Therefore, the conditional expression determining the company’s effort level of effort is

Marginal cost of increase in effort = marginal benefit of increase in effort [1 – proportion to be borne by local government (= the proportion of their investment)]

In so farThus, in as much as the normal assumption (increasea rise in the marginal cost of an increase inincreased effort implies a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, itthe expectation is forecast that the biggergreater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a positive the impact on managementthe business.