経営ノウハウを供給する企業の努力によって、利益水準が決定されるモデルを想定してみよう。事後的に生じた利益のある部分は、出資割合に応じて自治体に帰着すると考えるのが自然である。このとき、経営ノウハウを供給する企業の選択する努力水準を考えてみよう。それは、努力水準を増加させたときの費用と収益を比較し、限界的に等しくなるところまで努力を行うであろう。しかしながら、収益の一部は、すでに述べたように、出資割合に応じて、自治体に搾取されるのである。したがって、努力水準を決める条件式は、
(努力増加の)限界費用=限界便益(1-自治体の負担割合(=出資割合))
になり、通常の仮定(努力増加の限界費用は逓増、限界便益は逓減)をする限り、出資割合が小さいほど、努力水準は過少になる。これが、民間のモラルハザードである。したがって、このような状況では、民間出資割合が大きいほど、経営にはプラスの影響を及ぼすと予想される。
Let us try to simulate a model for determining the level of profits as a result of the efforts of the company supplying management expertise. It is natural that a portion of the profit that arose ex post facto should revert to the local government, in line with the proportion of their investment. Now, let us try to consider the level of effort selected by the company supplying management expertise. This is surely effort up till the point that the costs and revenue associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, part of the revenue, as already mentioned, is extracted by the local government in line with the proportion of their investment. Therefore, the conditional expression determining the level of effort is
Marginal cost of increase in effort = marginal benefit of increase in effort [1 – proportion to be borne by local government (= the proportion of their investment)]
In so far as the normal assumption (increase in the marginal cost of an increase in effort implies decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, it is forecast that the bigger the proportion of private-sector investment, the more positive the impact on management.
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Marginal cost of increase in effort = marginal benefit of increase in effort [1 – proportion to be borne by local government (= the proportion of their investment)]
In so farThus, in as much as the normal assumption (increasea rise in the marginal cost of an increase inincreased effort implies a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the smaller the proportion of investment, the smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, itthe expectation is forecast that the biggergreater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a positive the impact on managementthe business.
Here, we attempt to simulate a model that determines the level ofa private company’s profit resulting from the effort of the private company brought on board to supplyfrom supplying effort to share business expertise. Naturally, part of the profit generated in relevant projects should revert accrue to the local government, in line with the proportion of their its investment. Let us consider the level of effort that the private company supplying business expertise will opt forthe effort level chosen by the company in such a situation. This would surely be effort upThe company would supply effort until to the point threshold where the associated marginal costs and the earnings benefits associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, some of the earnings, as already mentioned, a part of the benefits are is extracted by the local government. , in line with the proportion of their investment. Therefore, the conditional expression determiningthe conditional determinant of the company’s effort level is
Marginal cost of increasinge in effort = marginal benefit of from increasinge in effort [1 – proportion borne byaccrued to the local government (= the proportion of their the government’s investment)]
Thus, in as much asas long as the normal standard assumption of (a rise in the marginal cost of increased effort implies implying a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the a smaller the proportion of investment, the would lead to a lower smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, the expectation is that the a greater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a positive impact on the business. will positively impact the business.
Here, we attempt to simulate a model that determines the level ofa private company’s profit resulting from the effort of the private company brought on board to supplyfrom supplying effort to share business expertise. Naturally, part of the profit generated in relevant projects should revert accrue to the local government, in line with the proportion of their its investment. Let us consider the level of effort that the private company supplying business expertise will opt forthe effort level chosen by the company in such a situation. This would surely be effort upThe company would supply effort until to the point threshold where the associated marginal costs and the earnings benefits associated with increasing the effort level, when compared, are marginally equal. However, some of the earnings, as already mentioned, a part of the benefits are is extracted by the local government. , in line with the proportion of their investment. Therefore, the conditional expression determiningthe conditional determinant of the company’s effort level is
Marginal cost of increasinge in effort = marginal benefit of from increasinge in effort [1 – proportion borne byaccrued to the local government (= the proportion of their the government’s investment)]
Thus, in as much asas long as the normal standard assumption of (a rise in the marginal cost of increased effort implies implying a decline in marginal benefit) holds, the a smaller the proportion of investment, the would lead to a lower smaller the effort level. This is a private-sector moral hazard. Therefore, under such circumstances, the expectation is that the a greater the proportion of private-sector investment, the more there will be a positive impact on the business. will positively impact the business.